An Efficient Analytical Solution to Thwart DDoS Attacks in Public Domain by Gupta, B. B. et al.
International Conference on Advances in Computing, Communication and Control (ICAC3’09) 
An Efficient Analytical Solution to Thwart DDoS Attacks in 
Public Domain 
B. B. Gupta 
Department of Electronics and 
Computer Engineering 
Indian Institute of Technology, 
Roorkee-247667, India  
bbgupta@ieee.org 
 
R. C. Joshi 
Department of Electronics and 
Computer Engineering 
Indian Institute of Technology, 
Roorkee-247667, India  
 
       Manoj Misra 
Department of Electronics and 
Computer Engineering 
Indian Institute of Technology, 
Roorkee-247667, India  
 
   
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, an analytical model for DDoS attacks detection is 
proposed, in which propagation of abrupt traffic changes inside 
public domain is monitored to detect a wide range of DDoS 
attacks. Although, various statistical measures can be used to 
construct profile of the traffic normally seen in the network to 
identify anomalies whenever traffic goes out of profile, we have 
selected volume and flow measure. Consideration of varying 
tolerance factors make proposed detection system scalable to the 
varying network conditions and attack loads in real time. NS-2 
network simulator on Linux platform is used as simulation 
testbed. Simulation results show that our proposed solution gives 
a drastic improvement in terms of detection rate and false 
positive rate. However, the mammoth volume generated by 
DDoS attacks pose the biggest challenge in terms of memory and 
computational overheads as far as monitoring and analysis of 
traffic at single point connecting victim is concerned. To address 
this problem, a distributed cooperative technique is proposed that 
distributes memory and computational overheads to all edge 
routers for detecting a wide range of DDoS attacks at early stage. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network 
Operations-Network Management; K.6.5 [Management of 
Computing and Information System]: Security and Protection 
General Terms 
Design, Experimentation, Security 
Keywords 
Distributed Denial of Service Attacks, Security, False Positives, 
False Negatives. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Breaches in network security represent a growing problem to 
businesses and institutions, costing them billions of dollars every 
year. According to statistics given by CERT [1], a mere 171 
vulnerabilities were reported in 1995 that boomed to 7236 in 
2007. Already, the number for the same has gone up to 6058 
until the third quarter of 2008. Apart from these, a large number 
of vulnerabilities go unreported every year. In particular, Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attacks are a major threat to the Internet. DDoS 
attacks are commonly characterized as events where legitimate 
users or organizations are deprived of certain services like web, 
e-mail or network connectivity that they normally expect to have 
[2]. Therefore, as given by Weiler [3] they attempt:  (1) To 
inhibit legitimate network traffic by flooding the network with 
useless traffic. (2) To deny access to a service by disrupting 
connections between two parties. (3) To block the access of a 
particular individual to a service. (4) To disrupt the specific 
system or service itself. Series of DDoS attacks that shut down 
some high profile websites have demonstrated the severe 
consequences of these attacks [4]. As per computer crime and 
security survey conducted by FBI/CSI in the United States for the 
year 2004 [5], these attacks are the second most widely detected 
outsider attack types in computer networks immediately after 
virus infections. A computer crime and security survey conducted 
in Australia for the year 2004 [6] shows similar results.  
In this paper, we have proposed an analytical model, which 
concentrates on detection of a wide range of DDoS attacks, e.g. 
high rate disruptive, diluted low rate degrading and varied rate, 
by monitoring propagation of abrupt traffic changes inside public 
domain. Although, various statistical measures can be used to 
identify anomalous behavior of the system, we have selected 
volume and flow measure. Consideration of varying tolerance 
factors make proposed detection system scalable to the varying 
network conditions and attack loads in real time. Internet type 
topologies used for simulations are generated using Transit-Stub 
model of GT-ITM topology generator [7]. NS-2 [8] on Linux 
platform is used as simulation testbed. Simulation results 
demonstrate that proposed scheme inflicts an extremely high 
detection rate with low false positive rate. However, the 
mammoth volume generated by DDoS attacks pose the biggest 
challenge in terms of memory and computational overheads as 
far as monitoring and analysis of traffic at single point 
connecting victim is concerned. These overheads make DDoS 
solution itself vulnerable against these attacks. To address this 
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problem, we present a distributed cooperative technique that 
distributes memory and computational overheads to all edge 
routers for detecting variety of DDoS attacks at early stage. Two 
types of detectors are used in this approach: local detector and 
central detector. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 
contains DDoS overview, 3 points out related work, section 4 
presents analytical model for DDoS attack detection, section 5 
describes our proposed approach in detail, section 6 contains 
experimental design and performance analysis and section 7 
describes proposed distributed cooperative techniques for DDoS 
attack detection. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper and 
outlines future work. 
2. DDOS OVERVIEW 
DDoS is basically a resource overloading problem. The resource 
can be bandwidth, memory, CPU cycles, file descriptors and 
buffers etc. The attackers bombard scare resource either by flood 
Internet
Legitimate User
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Router
Zombie Machines
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 Figure 1. Illustration of the DDoS attack scenario 
 
of packets or a single logic packet, which can activate a series of 
processes to exhaust the limited resource [9]. In the Figure 1, 
simplified DDoS attack scenario is illustrated.  The figure shows 
that attacker uses three zombie machines to generate mammoth 
volume of malicious traffic to flood the victim over the Internet 
thus rendering legitimate user unable to access the services. 
Extremely sophisticated, user friendly, automated and powerful 
DDoS toolkits are available for attacking the victim, so expertise 
is not necessarily required that attract naive users to perform 
DDoS attacks [10].  
2.1 Attack: Modus Operandi 
DDoS attack is carried out from multiple sources to aim at a 
single target, in several phases. Figure 2 shows a hierarchical 
model of a DDoS attack. In order to launch a DDoS attack, the 
attacker first scan millions of machines for vulnerable services 
and other weakness on the Internet through high-bandwidth, 
always-on connections that permit penetrations. The discovered 
vulnerabilities are then exploited to gain access and plant 
malicious codes on these machines so called handlers, or 
masters. After being installed the malicious scripts, these 
infected machines can repeat the same procedure to recruit more 
machines so called zombies or slaves. These all exploited 
machines used as attack army, are collectively called bots and the 
attack network is known as botnet in the hacker’s community. 
Then the communication channels between the attacker and the 
masters and between the masters and slaves are established. 
These control channels are designed to be secret to public [11]. 
Staying behind the scenes of attack, the real attacker sends a 
command to the masters to initiate a coordinated attack. When 
the masters receive the command, they transfer it to the slaves 
under their control. Upon receiving attack commands, the 
zombies or slaves begin the attack on the victim [12]. 
The real attacker is trying to hide himself from detection, for 
example, by providing spoofed IP addresses [11, 13]. 
Master Master MasterMaster
Slave SlaveSlave Slave SlaveSlave
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Attacker
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 Communication
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Figure 2. A hierarchical model of a DDoS attack 
3. RELATED WORK 
Various reviews have been given in [10, 13, 14] on DDoS attacks 
and defense methods. Attack detection aims to detect an ongoing 
attack and to discriminate malicious traffic from legitimate 
traffic. 
Detection can be performed using database of known signatures, 
by recognizing anomalies in system behaviors or using third 
party. Signature based approach [15, 16] employs a priori 
knowledge of attack signatures. The signatures are manually 
constructed by security experts analyzing previous attacks and 
used to match with incoming traffic to detect intrusions. SNORT 
[15] and Bro [16] are the two widely used signature based 
detection approaches. 
Anomaly detection [17-20] relies on detecting behaviors that are 
abnormal with respect to some normal standard. Detecting DDoS 
attacks involves first knowing normal behavior of our system and 
then to find deviations from that behavior. Mirkovic et al. [17] 
proposed D-WARD defense system that does DDoS attack 
detection at source, based on the idea that DDoS attacks should 
be stopped as close to the source as possible. Cheng et al. [18] 
proposed to use spectral analysis to identify DoS attack flows. 
Lee and Stolfo [19] used data mining techniques to discover 
patterns of system features that describe program and user 
behavior and implement a classifier that can recognize anomalies 
and intrusions. Bencsath et al. [20] have given a volume based 
approach, in which incoming traffic is monitored continuously 
and dangerous traffic intensity rises are detected. This approach 
is suitable for detecting high rate attacks, but ineffective to detect 
low rate degrading attacks.  
Mechanisms that deploy third-party detection do not handle the 
detection process themselves, but rely on an external third party 
that signals the occurrence of the attack [13].   
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4. ANALYTICAL MODEL DESCRIPTION 
This section describes an analytical model we have constructed 
to represent general form of proposed detection system. 
Detecting DDoS attacks involve first knowing normal profile of 
the system and then to find deviations from this normal profile. 
Whenever incoming traffic goes out of the normal profile, 
anomalous system behavior is identified. Our approach detects 
flooding DDoS attacks by the constant monitoring the 
propagation of abrupt traffic changes inside the public domain. 
Various statistical measures e.g. volume, flow, entropy, ratio etc 
are available for profile generation.  
Let M and F are random vectors compose of m measures m1, m2, 
….., mm  used for attacks detection and n flows f1, f2, ……., fn 
containing the incoming traffic to the server, respectively: M= 
(m1, m2, ….., mm), F= (f1, f2,………….., fn). where fi= 
( 1im , 2im ,……., imm  ) is ith flow. Consider a random process 
{ ( )ijm t , t = ω ∆ , Nω ∈ }, where ∆ is a constant time interval, 
N is the set of positive integers, and for each t, ( )ijm t  is a 
random variables. 1 lω≤ ≤ , l is the number of time intervals. 
Here ( )ijm t represents the value of mj  in flow i in {t-∆, t} time 
duration. These relations can be written in matrix form as 
follows:  
Z (t) = 1( ) ( )1 1 1
1 ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) ( )
i n
m t m t m
i n
m t m t mj j j
i n
m t m t m t
m m m
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


  

                                                 (1) 
here, Z (t)
  
contains values of different measures used in {t−∆, t}. 
( )jm t  represent total value of j
th
 measure during {t−∆, t} time. 
( )jm t  can be calculated as follows: 
( )jm t = 1 2( ) ( ) . ... ... ( ) ... .... . ( )i nj j j jm t m t m t m t+ + + + +         (2)   
where 1 i n≤ ≤ , n is the number of flows. 1 j m≤ ≤ , m is 
the number of measures. Normal traffic value of jth measures can 
be calculated using following equation: 
 
*
( )jm t =
1
1 ( )
l
jm tl ω
ω
=
= ∆∑                                                    
(3)                                                                                                                                                  
Vector A can be used to represent normal traffic measures value: 
A= ( *
1 ( )m t ,
*
2 ( )m t ,…., 
*
( )mm t ). To detect the attack, the 
value of jth traffic measure ( )jm t  is calculated in time 
window ∆ continuously; whenever there is appreciable 
deviation from * ( )jm t , anomalous behaviors could be 
determined. Depending on the measures selected to use or 
network conditions, following event is defined to determine 
anomalous system behaviors:          
( )jm t -
*
( )jm t > jξ                                                                   
(4)                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
where jξ represent value of the threshold for jth measure. jξ  can 
be set as follows: 
 
jξ = jr * jσ                                                                       (5)                                                                                  
where jσ  represent value of standard deviation for j
th
 measure. 
jr represent value of tolerance factor to calculate the threshold 
for  jth measure. Effectiveness of an anomaly based detection 
system highly depends on accuracy of threshold value settings. 
Inaccurate threshold values cause a large number of false 
positives and false negatives. Therefore, various simulations are 
performed using different value of tolerance factors. The choice 
of tolerance factors varies for different network conditions. 
Values of tolerance factors also depend on the composition of the 
normal traffic and the desired degree of the ability to control a 
DDoS attack. Then, trade-off between detection and false 
positive rate provides guidelines for selecting value of tolerance 
factor rj for jth traffic measure for a particular simulation 
environment. 
5. PROPOSED APPROACH 
Detection system is part of access router or can belong to 
separate unit that interact with access router to detect attack 
traffic. Detecting DDoS attacks involve first knowing normal 
traffic model of our system and then to find deviations from this 
normal traffic model. Our approach detects flooding DDoS 
attacks by monitoring the propagation of abrupt traffic changes 
inside the network. Analytical model describe in the section 4 is 
used here. Although, various statistical measures can be used to 
capture anomalous behavior of the system, we have selected 
volume and flow measure. 
Let * ( )X t
n
be the normal traffic, indicating total bytes arriving 
at a target machine in ∆ time duration. Assume that the target 
machine is intruded by DDoS attacks at time ta. Generally, target 
may not overwhelm immediately at ta. Assume attacker has attack 
traffic rate such that it overwhelms target completely at time tb, 
so target is unable to provide any
 
service to its customers. Time 
duration (ta, tb) is known as transition period of attack. A good 
detection approach must have detection time td<tb, so the target 
may be avoided being overwhelmed completely. Let ( )inX t be 
the traffic during transition period (ta, tb), then we can express 
( )inX t as follows: 
( )inX t = *( )nX t + ˆ ( )X t ,                            (8) 
where ˆ ( )X t  is the component of the attack traffic. ( )inX t -
* ( )nX t  using equation (8) can be used for detection purpose. To 
set normal profile, consider a random process { ( )X t , t = 
ω∆ , Nω∈ }, where ∆ is a constant time interval, N is the set of 
positive integers, and for each t, X (t) is a random variable. 
1 lω≤ ≤ , l is the number of time intervals.  Here X (t) represents 
the total traffic volume in {t − ∆, t} time interval. X (t) is 
calculated during time interval {t − ∆, t} as follows:  
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1
( ) , 1, 2....
N f
i f
i
X t n i N
=
= =∑ . Here, ni represents total number of 
bytes arrivals for a flow i in {t−∆, t} and fN represent total 
number of flows. We take average of X (t) and designate it as 
* ( )nX t  normal traffic Volume. Similarly, value of flow measure 
is calculated and designates that as * ( )nF t . Here total bytes, not 
packets are used to calculate volume measure, because it 
provides  
 more accuracy, as different flows can contain packets of 
different sizes. To detect the attack, the value of traffic measure 
( )inX t and flow measure ( )inF t is calculated in time window ∆ 
continuously; whenever there is appreciable deviation from 
* ( )nX t and * ( )nF t , various types of attacks are detected using 
algorithm 1 as given in figure 3. Threshold values thξ and thς  are 
set as follows: 
 
*th Vrξ σ=                                                     (9) 
*th Frς σ=                                                   (10) 
where Vσ , Fσ represents value of standard deviation for volume 
measure and flow measure, respectively. 
 Figure 3.  Algorithm for DDoS attacks Detection 
We have taken same value of tolerance factor for both volume 
and flow measure. r I∈ , represent value of tolerance factor, 
where I is a set of integers.  
6. EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
We tested and evaluated proposed approach with monitoring data 
to confirm its effectiveness to detect variety of DDoS attacks. 
6.1 Simulation Environment 
The simulation is carried out using NS-2 [8] network simulator. 
At present, the Internet can be viewed as a collection of 
interconnected routing domains, which are groups of nodes under 
a common administration that share routing information. A 
primary characteristic of these domains is routing locality, in 
which the path between any two nodes in a domain remains 
entirely within the domain. Thus, each routing domain in the 
Internet can be classified as either a stub or a transit domain 
[21]. A domain is a stub domain if the path connecting nodes N1 
and N2 passes through that domain and if either N1 or N2 is 
located in that domain. Transit domains do not have this 
restriction. The purpose of transit domains is to interconnect stub 
domains efficiently. Therefore, real-world Internet type 
topologies generated using Transit-Stub model of GT-ITM [7] 
topology generator is used to test our proposed scheme, where 
transit domains are treated as different Internet Service Provider. 
Topology contains four transit domains. Total four hundred 
legitimate client machines are used to generate background 
traffic. Total zombie machines range between ten and hundred to 
generate attack traffic. Transit domain four contains the server 
machine to be attacked. A short scale simulation topology is 
shown in figure 4. The legitimate clients are TCP agents that 
request files of size 1 Mbps each with request inter-arrival times 
drawn from a Poisson distribution. The attackers are modeled by 
UDP agents. A UDP connection is used instead of a TCP one 
because in a practical attack flow, the attacker would normally 
never follow the basic rules of TCP, i.e. waiting for ACK packets 
before the next window of outstanding packets can be sent, etc. 
The rate of attack traffic range between 0.1 and 3.5 Mbps per 
attack daemon. The size of monitoring window affects the 
number of attack alerts raised. In our experiments, the 
monitoring time window was set to 200 ms, as the typical 
domestic Internet RTT is around 100 ms and the average global 
Internet RTT is 140 ms [22]. 
 
 
ISP  Doma in
Clien t Ma chine
Router
Zombie M achine
Server
 
 
Algorithm 1: DDoS attacks Detection Algorithm 
Input: *( )nX t : Normal traffic Volume measure 
* ( )nF t :   Normal traffic Flow measure 
thξ : Threshold value for Volume measure 
thς :  Threshold value for Flow measure. 
Output: DDoS attack alert generation. 
Procedure: 
01: Consider a random process { ( )inX t , ( )inF t , t = 
ω ∆ , Nω ∈ }, where ∆ is a constant time interval, N is the 
set of positive integers, and for each t , ( )inX t and ( )inF t  are 
random variables. 1 lω≤ ≤ , l is the number of time 
intervals. Here, ( )inX t represents value of volume measure 
and ( )inF t  represents value of flow measure in time duration 
{t−∆, t}. 
02: If (( *( ) ( )in n thX t X t ξ− > ) || ( *( ) ( )in n thF t F t ς− > )) Then 
Attack pattern detected. 
DDoS attack alert is generated. 
03: Else If (( *( ) ( )in n thX t X t ξ− < ) && ( *( ) ( )in n thF t F t ς− < )) 
Then System is attack free. 
Attack alert is not generated. 
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Figure 4.  A short scale simulation topology 
 
Total false positive alarms are minimum, using this value of 
monitoring window.  
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Figure 5. Temporal variation of volume measure when 
system is in normal condition, under low rate DDoS attack, 
and under high rate DDoS attack 
False positive alarm number increases steadily with increasing 
monitoring window size. The simulations are repeated and 
different attack scenarios are implemented by varying total 
number of zombie machines and at different attack strengths. 
Figure 5 shows temporal variation of volume measures when 
system is in normal condition, under low rate DDoS attack and 
under high rate DDoS attack. DDoS attacks start at 25th second 
and end at 50th second. Here total 400 client machines are used 
to send TCP traffic. Low rate attack is performed using 100 
zombie machines with mean rate 0.1Mbps per attacker. To 
perform high rate attack 100 zombie machines are used with 
mean rate 3Mbps per attacker. As shown in figure 5, it is clear 
that low rate attacks are nearly undetectable when using only 
volume as statistical measure. 
350
365
380
395
410
425
440
455
470
485
500
515
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
Simulation Time (sec)
Fl
o
w
 
Un de r A tt a c k  (  us in g  10 0
Zo m bie  M a c h in e s )
Un de r A tt a c k  ( us ing  7 5
Zo m bie  M a c h in e s )
Un de r A tt a c k  ( us ing  5 0
Zo m bie  M a c h in e s )
Un de r A tt a c k  ( us ing  2 5
Zo m bie  M a c h in e s )
N o rm a l
 
Figure 6. Temporal variation of Flow measure when system 
is in normal condition, and under DDoS attack using 25, 50, 
75 and 100 zombie machines 
For detection of low rate DDoS attack correctly with low false 
positive rate, flow measure is also considered along with volume 
measure. Figure 6 shows temporal variation of flow measure 
when system is in normal condition and under DDoS attack using 
25, 50, 75 and 100 zombie machines.  
It is clear from the figure 5 and figure 6, that low rate DDoS 
attacks perform using large number of zombie machines are also 
easily detected by taking both flow and volume measure 
simultaneously.  
6.2 Performance Evaluation Metrics 
We have used three metrics to evaluate performance of our 
proposed DDoS detection approach, namely, detection rate (Rd), 
false positive alarm rate (Rfp), and receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC). The detection rate (Rd) is the measure of 
percentage of attacks detected among all actual attacks 
performed. The detection rate (Rd) is defined as follows: 
Rd =d/n                                                                                    
(11) 
Where d is the number of DDoS attacks detected and n is the 
total number of actual attacks generated during the simulation. 
The false positive alarm rate (Rfp) is the measure of percentage 
of false positives among all normal traffic events defined as 
follows: 
Rfp =f/m                                                                      
(12) 
where f is the number of false positive alarm raised by attack 
detection mechanism, and n is the total number of normal traffic 
flow events during the simulation. The ROC curve is used to 
evaluate tradeoff between detection rate and false positive rate. 
6.3 Simulation Results and Discussion 
Figure 7 illustrates the variation of the detection and false 
positive rate with respect to different value of detection tolerance 
factor r, when DDoS attack is performed using packets of size 
512 bytes and 1024 bytes. Detection rate is close to 99% when r 
<=6 and false positive alarm rate is <=3% when r >=6. Above 
result demonstrates that detection rate is very high with low false 
positive rate when r=6. The ROC curve in figure 8 also shows 
same results. Therefore, value of r is taken 6 in our approach. 
Value of r can vary for different network conditions and correct 
value can be selected by drawing tradeoff between detection and 
false positive rate. 
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Figure 7.  Effect of detection tolerance factor on the detection 
and false positive rate when attack is perform using packets 
of size 512 bytes and 1024 bytes 
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Figure 8.  ROC curve showing the trade-off between the 
detection rate and false positive rate of DDoS attacks when 
attack is perform using packets of size 512 bytes and 1024 
bytes 
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7. DISTRIBUTED COOPERATIVE 
TECHNIQUE  
DDoS attacks are best detected near the victim’s site i.e. at 
bottleneck router, as maximum attack traffic converges at this 
point. However, the mammoth volume generated by DDoS 
attacks pose the biggest challenge in terms of memory and 
computational overheads as far as monitoring and analysis of 
traffic at single point connecting victim is concerned. These 
overheads make DDoS solution itself vulnerable against these 
attacks. To address this problem, we present a distributed 
cooperative technique that distributes memory and computational 
overheads to all edge routers for detecting a wide range of DDoS 
attacks at early stage. Two types of detectors are used in our 
approach:  local detector and central detector.  
7.1 Local Detector  
Local detectors are deployed on edge routers of the domain. 
These detectors are used to check flow statistics i.e. volume and 
flow measure, during time ∆ duration. Whenever there is 
appreciable deviation from normal profile, a Suspicious Alarm 
(SA) is reported to central detector. 
7.2 Central Detector  
Central detector is deployed on router to which protected server 
is attached. Central detector detects attacks not only by passively 
listening for SA from local detectors, but also by actively sending 
queries to the local detectors to confirm alarms. Central detector 
also checks flow statistics for attack detection during constant 
time window. Central detector passively waits for suspicious 
alarms to arrive from edge routers, and whenever it crosses 
threshold, DDoS attacks confirmation alarm is generated. 
All the calculation regarding volume and flow metrics are done 
at edge routers. These information plus attacks alert plus active 
flow list are sent to access router then based on the alert receive, 
access router decides about attack. Simultaneously access router 
itself checks the statistics and then compares with the threshold 
and generates attack alert alarm. Therefore, no need of 
computational and storage requirement at access router as edge 
router do all the calculation. For flow measure calculation, flows 
list from all edge routers are added and common flows are 
deleted. Then total flows are counted from that list. 
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK  
In this paper, we analytically detect a wide range of DDoS 
attacks i.e. high rate disruptive, diluted low rate degrading and 
varied rate by monitoring the propagation of abrupt traffic 
changes. Simulation results are very promising by using volume 
and flow measure to capture anomalous behavior of the system. 
Proposed approach have limitation in terms of memory and 
computational overheads as monitoring and analysis of traffic is 
performed at single point i.e. bottleneck router. To address this 
problem, a distributed cooperative technique is proposed that 
distributes memory and computational overheads to all edge 
routers for detecting a wide range of DDoS attacks at early stage. 
Although simulation results are promising, but in future work we 
plan to validate our approach with real datasets. 
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